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RESURRECTION AXIOMS AND UPLIFTING CARDINALS
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND THOMAS A. JOHNSTONE
Abstract. We introduce the resurrection axioms, a new class of forcing
axioms, and the uplifting cardinals, a new large cardinal notion, and
prove that various instances of the resurrection axioms are equiconsistent
over ZFC with the existence of an uplifting cardinal.
1. Introduction
Many classical forcing axioms can be viewed, at least informally, as the
claim that the universe is existentially closed in its forcing extensions, for the
axioms generally assert that certain kinds of filters, which could exist in a
forcing extension V [G], exist already in V . In several instances this informal
perspective is realized more formally: Martin’s axiom is equivalent to the
assertion that Hc is existentially closed in all c.c.c. forcing extensions of the
universe, meaning that Hc ≺Σ1 V [G] for all such extensions; the bounded
proper forcing axiom is equivalent to the assertion that Hω2 is existentially
closed in all proper forcing extensions, or Hω2 ≺Σ1 V [G]; and there are other
similar instances.
In model theory, a submodel M ⊆ N is existentially closed in N if ex-
istential assertions true in N about parameters in M are true already in
M , that is, if M is a Σ1-elementary substructure of N , which we write as
M ≺Σ1 N . Furthermore, in a general model-theoretic setting, existential
closure is tightly connected with resurrection, the theme of this article.
Fact 1. If M is a submodel of N , then the following are equivalent.
(1) The model M is existentially closed in N
(2) M⊆ N has resurrection. That is, there is a further extension M⊆
N ⊆M+ for which M≺M+.
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Proof. IfM is existentially closed inN , then by compactness the elementary
diagram of M is consistent with the atomic diagram of N , and any model
of this combined theory provides the desired M+. Conversely, resurrection
implies existential closure, since any witness in N still exists inM+, and so
M has witnesses by the elementarity of M≺M+. 
We call this “resurrection,” because although certain truths in M may
no longer hold in the extension N , these truths are nevertheless revived in
light of M≺M+ in the further extension to M+. A difficulty arises when
applying fact 1 in the context of forcing axioms, however, where set theorists
seek principally to understand how a given model M relates to its forcing
extensions, rather than to the more arbitrary extensions M+ arising from
the compactness theorem. The problem is that when one restricts the class
of permitted models M+ in fact 1, the equivalence of (1) and (2) can break
down. Nevertheless, the converse implication (2)→ (1) always holds: every
instance of resurrection implies the corresponding instance of existential clo-
sure. This key observation leads us to the main unifying theme of this article,
the idea that resurrection may allow us to formulate more robust
forcing axioms than existential closure or than combinatorial assertions
about filters and dense sets.
We shall therefore introduce in this paper a spectrum of new forcing
axioms utilizing the resurrection concept. We shall analyze the relations
between these new forcing axioms and the classical axioms, and in many
cases find their exact large cardinal consistency strength. The main idea is
to replace a forcing axiom expressible as
∀Q M≺Σ1 M
V [g], whenever g ⊆ Q is V -generic
with an axiom asserting full elementarity in a further extension:
∀Q ∃ R˙ M≺MV [g∗h], whenever g ∗ h ⊆ Q ∗ R˙ is V -generic,
where in each case the forcing notions Q and R˙ will be of a certain specified
type appropriate for that forcing axiom. We had mentioned earlier that
under MA or BPFA (which implies c = ω2), the set Hc is existentially closed
in V [g] for all c.c.c. or proper forcing g ⊆ Q, respectively, and the case of
M = 〈Hc,∈〉 is central.
Main Definition 2. Let Γ be a fixed definable class of forcing notions.
(1) The resurrection axiom RA(Γ) is the assertion that for every forcing
notion Q ∈ Γ there is further forcing R˙, with Q R˙ ∈ Γ, such that if
g ∗ h ⊆ Q ∗ R˙ is V -generic, then Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c .
(2) The weak resurrection axiom wRA(Γ) is the assertion that for every
Q ∈ Γ there is further forcing R˙, such that if g ∗ h ⊆ Q ∗ R˙ is
V -generic, then Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c .
The difference between the full axiom and the weak form is that the full
axiom insists that the second step of forcing R˙ is also chosen from Γ, as
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interpreted in the extension V [g], while the weak axiom drops this restric-
tion. When determining whether Q R˙ ∈ Γ, we give Γ the de dicto reading,
meaning that we reinterpret Γ in the extension V [g], using the definition
of Γ in that model, so the question is whether R˙g ∈ Γ
V [g]. Definition 2 is
a special case of the more general resurrection axiom RA(Γ0,Γ1), asserting
that for every Q ∈ Γ0 there is further forcing R˙ with Q R˙ ∈ Γ1, such that
whenever g ∗ h ⊆ Q ∗ R˙ is V -generic, then Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c ; but we shall not
analyze this more general axiom here.
We shall consider instances RA(Γ) and wRA(Γ) for various natural classes
Γ of forcing notions, such as RA(ccc) and wRA(ccc) for the class of all
c.c.c. posets, RA(proper) and wRA(proper) for the class of all proper posets,
and RA(all) for the class of all posets. Note that wRA(all) is the same as
RA(all). If Γ is any class of forcing notions, then RA(all) implies wRA(Γ),
and RA(Γ) implies wRA(Γ). Moreover, if Γ1 ⊆ Γ2 are two classes of forcing
notions, then wRA(Γ2) implies wRA(Γ1), but in general RA(Γ2) need not
imply RA(Γ1).
Regarding the existential-closure remark in the opening sentence of this
article, we note that the full set-theoretic universe V is never actually ex-
istentially closed in any nontrivial extension V ( W . The point is that W
will have some set z not in V , and an ∈-minimal such z will have z ⊆ y for
some y ∈ V , meaning that W thinks there is a subset of y not in P (y)V ,
but V does not; this is a Σ1 assertion about P (y)
V showing that V 6≺Σ1 W .
Similarly, in a nontrivial set-forcing extension V ⊆ V [g] for V -generic g ⊆ Q,
where D is the collection of all dense subsets of Q in V , the universe V [g]
contains a filter that meets all elements of D, but V does not; and again
this is a Σ1 assertion about D. If the forcing extension V ⊆ V [g] adds a
new real, then the collection H
c
+ is not existentially closed in V [g], because
the forcing extension V [g] contains a subset of ω that is not an element of
P(ω)V , but H
c
+ does not. So if our forcing notions will be able to add reals,
then we will not have any existential closure for Hκ when c < κ, pointing
again at the centrality of the case of Hc. Meanwhile, if κ is any uncountable
cardinal, then the Le´vy absoluteness theorem shows that Hκ ≺Σ1 V , and so
in particular, Hc is always existentially closed in V . As intended, the res-
urrection axioms imply that this structure Hc remains existentially closed
with respect to forcing extensions:
Observation 3. The weak resurrection axiom wRA(Γ) implies that Hc is ex-
istentially closed in all forcing extensions by posets from Γ. That is, wRA(Γ)
implies that Hc ≺Σ1 V [g], whenever Q ∈ Γ and g ⊆ Q is V -generic.
Proof. Suppose that Q ∈ Γ and g ⊆ Q is V -generic. By wRA(Γ), there
is R ∈ V [g] such that if h ⊆ R is V [g]-generic, then Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c . By
the Le´vy absoluteness theorem, which amounts to a simple Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem and reflection argument to collapse the existential witness to a set
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of hereditary size less than c, we have H
V [g∗h]
c ≺Σ1 V [g ∗ h] and therefore
Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c ≺Σ1 V [g ∗ h], which implies Hc ≺Σ1 V [g ∗ h], as desired. 
We shall try in this article to use standard notation. We denote the
continuum 2ω by c, and for any infinite cardinal δ, we write Hδ for the set
of all sets hereditarily of size less than δ, that is, with transitive closure
of size less than δ. In particular, Hc is the collection of sets hereditarily
of size less than the continuum. Relativizing this concept to a particular
model of set theory W , we write HW
c
to mean the collection of sets in
W that are hereditarily of size less than cW in W . Unadorned with such
relativizing exponents, notation such as c and Hc will always refer to the
interpretation of these terms in the default ground model V . We shall use
the notation f ...X → Y for partial functions, to indicate that dom(f) ⊆ X
and ran(f) ⊆ Y .
Velicˇkovic´ and Hamkins had initially considered an extreme form of res-
urrection, the axiom asserting that for every partial order Q, there is R˙
such that after forcing with Q ∗ R˙, there is an elementary embedding j :
V → V [g ∗ h]. This axiom, however, is refuted by the generalization of the
Kunen inconsistency showing that there is never any nontrivial elementary
embedding j : V → V [G] in any forcing extension V [G] (see [HKP12]).
Nevertheless, a restriction of the axiom remains interesting: if there is a
rank-into-rank embedding j : Vλ → Vλ, then after certain preparatory forc-
ing V = V [G], they observed, for any Q ∈ V λ = Vλ[G] |= ZFC there is
R˙, such that in the corresponding extension V [g ∗ h] there is an elemen-
tary embedding j : V λ → V λ[g ∗ h]; and one may assume without loss that
cp(j) = ω1. If one restricts to proper forcing or other classes, then one may
insist on cp(j) = ω2, and so on. By considering j ↾ Hκ, where κ = cp(j), one
is led directly to the resurrection axioms, which subsequently can be treated,
as we do in this article, with a much smaller large cardinal hypothesis.
2. Resurrection axioms and bounded forcing axioms
We regard the resurrection axioms as forcing axioms in light of their
consequences amongst the bounded forcing axioms, as in theorem 4, and
also because they express a precise logical connection between the universe
and its forcing extensions. For cardinals κ and collections Γ of forcing no-
tions, Goldstern and Shelah [GS95] introduced the bounded forcing axiom
BFAκ(Γ), which is the assertion that whenever Q ∈ Γ and B = r.o.(Q), if
A is a collection of at most κ many maximal antichains in B \ {0}, each an-
tichain of size at most κ, then there is a filter on B meeting each antichain in
A. With this terminology, BFAκ(ccc) is simply the same as Martin’s Axiom
MA(κ), and having BFAκ(ccc) for all κ < c amounts to the same as having
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MA. The bounded proper forcing axiom BPFA, as defined in [GS95], is the
same as BFAω1(proper).
1
Theorem 4. If Γ is any collection of posets, then wRA(Γ) implies BFAκ(Γ)
for any κ < c. In particular,
(1) wRA(ccc) implies MA.
(2) wRA(proper) + ¬CH implies BPFA.
(3) wRA(semi-proper) + ¬CH implies BSPFA.
(4) wRA(axiom-A) + ¬CH implies BAAFA.
(5) wRA(preserving stationary subsets of ω1) + ¬CH implies BMM.
Proof. Assume that wRA(Γ) holds and that κ < c is a cardinal. To verify
BFAκ(Γ), fix any Q ∈ Γ and let B = r.o.(Q) and A be any collection of κ
many maximal antichains in B \ {0}, each antichain of size at most κ. Let
B′ be the subalgebra of B generated by
⋃
A, so that B′ ⊇
⋃
A. Then B′ has
size at most κ, and we may assume without loss of generality that both A
and B′ are elements of Hκ+, and thus of Hc, by replacing B by an isomorphic
copy if necessary. If g ⊆ B is any V -generic filter, then it is also A-generic,
and so g ∩ B′ meets each antichain in A. Moreover, g ∩ B′ is a filter on B′,
since B′ is a subalgebra of B. Thus, there exists in V [g] an A-generic filter
on B′. Since Hc ≺Σ1 V [g] by observation 3, it follows by elementarity that
such an A-generic filter on B′ already exists in V . This filter generates in
V an A-generic filter on B, as desired. Statements (1)-(5) are immediate
consequences. 
Note that the failure of CH is a necessary hypothesis in statement (2);
the resurrection axiom RA(all) implies wRA(proper), but by theorem 5 it
also implies CH, which contradicts BPFA. For essentially the same reasons,
the failure of CH is necessary in statements (3)-(5) also.
As we mentioned, Stavi in the 1980’s (see [SV02, thm 25]) and indepen-
dently Bagaria [Bag97] characterized Martin’s axiom MA as being equiv-
alent to the assertion that Hc ≺Σ1 V [g] whenever g ⊆ Q is c.c.c. forcing.
Bagaria [Bag00] generalized this to all bounded forcing axioms BFAκ(Γ), and
it follows from his characterization that BFAκ(Γ) is equivalent to Hκ+ ≺Σ1
V [g] whenever Q ∈ Γ and g ⊆ Q is V -generic, assuming that κ is a cardinal
of uncountable cofinality and Γ is a collection of forcing notions such that
Q ∈ Γ implies Q ↾ q ∈ Γ for all q ∈ Γ. It follows, in particular, that BPFA
is equivalent to the assertion that Hω2 ≺Σ1 V [g] whenever g ⊆ Q is proper
forcing. Analogous characterizations hold for the axioms BSPFA, BAAFA,
and BMM. Moreover, it is easy to see that observation 3 and Bagaria’s char-
acterization of BPFAκ(Γ) allow for an alternative way of proving theorem 4.
1Analogously, the bounded semi-proper forcing axiom BSPFA is the same as
BFAω1(semi-proper), the bounded axiom-A forcing axiom BAAFA is the same as
BFAω1(axiom-A), and the bounded Martin’s maximum BMM is the same as BFAω1(Γ)
where Γ is the class of forcing notions that preserve stationary subsets of ω1.
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3. Resurrection axioms and the Size of the Continuum
Let us now consider the interaction of the resurrection axioms with the
size of the continuum.
Theorem 5. Under the weak resurrection axiom wRA(Γ), if some forcing
Q ∈ Γ can collapse a cardinal δ, then c ≤ δ. Consequently,
(1) RA(all) implies the continuum hypothesis CH.
(2) The weak resurrection axioms for axiom-A forcing, proper forcing,
semi-proper forcing, and forcing that preserves stationary subsets of
ω1, respectively, each imply that c ≤ ℵ2.
In other words, wRA(Γ) implies that every forcing notion Q ∈ Γ necessarily
preserves all cardinals below c.
Proof. Assume that wRA(Γ) holds and δ is a cardinal below c. Suppose for
contradiction that Q ∈ Γ and g ⊆ Q is V -generic such that δ is collapsed in
V [g]. Then Hc ≺Σ1 V [g] by observation 3, and in V [g], there is a function
witnessing that δ is not a cardinal, but such a function cannot exist in Hc,
a contradiction. Statement (1) follows by considering the canonical forcing
to collapse ℵ1 and (2) by collapsing ℵ2 using countably closed forcing. 
Justin Moore pointed out that if there are sufficient large cardinals, then
the converse of statement (1) is also true. The point is that if projec-
tive absoluteness holds, that is, if boldface projective truth is invariant by
forcing—and this is a consequence of sufficient large cardinals, such as a
proper class of Woodin cardinals—then the theory of Hω1 with parameters
is invariant by forcing, and so Hω1 ≺ H
V [g]
ω1 for any forcing extension. Thus,
projective absoluteness implies that RA(all) is simply equivalent to CH, and
so we place our focus on the other resurrection axioms. Meanwhile, we do
note that RA(all) is not equivalent to CH in ZFC, assuming Con(ZFC),
because it is equiconsistent with the existence of an uplifting cardinal by
theorem 21; see also theorems 8 and 16.
A similar argument as in theorem 5 shows that under the weak resurrec-
tion axiom wRA(Γ) every forcing notion Q ∈ Γ must necessarily preserve
all stationary subsets of ordinals below c. For instance, if S ⊆ ω1 is any sta-
tionary, co-stationary set and Q is the standard poset that uses countable
conditions to add a club subset C ⊆ S, then Q is countably distributive,
but it destroys the stationarity of the complement of S. It follows that the
weak resurrection axiom wRA(countably distributive) implies CH. More-
over, Shelah’s [AS83] modification of Baumgartner’s original poset to add
a club C ⊆ ω1 using finite conditions by restricting it to a stationary set,
provides an example of a cofinality-preserving forcing notion that can de-
stroy the stationarity of a subset of ω1. It follows that the weak resurrection
axiom wRA(cofinality-preserving) implies CH.
We shall show in section 5, relative to the existence of an uplifting cardi-
nal, that several instances of the resurrection axioms, such as RA(proper),
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RA(axiom-A), and RA(semi-proper), are consistent with c = ℵ2, the max-
imal possible size for the continuum under these axioms by theorem 5.
Relative to a supercompact uplifting cardinal, we show in section 6 that
RA(preserving stationary subsets of ω1) is consistent with c = ℵ2. Mean-
while, each of these axioms is relatively consistent with CH:
Theorem 6. The resurrection axiom RA(proper) is relatively consistent
with CH. The same is true of the axioms RA(axiom-A), RA(semi-proper)
and RA(preserving stationary subsets of ω1), and of RA(Γ) for any class Γ
necessarily closed under finite iterations and containing a poset forcing CH
without adding reals.
Proof. Let us illustrate in the case of proper forcing. Suppose that RA(proper)
holds, and G ⊆ P is V -generic, where P = Add(ω1, 1) is the canonical forc-
ing of the CH. Consider any proper Q ∈ V [G]. Since P ∗ Q˙ is proper in
V , there is further proper forcing R˙ such that if G ∗ g ∗ h ⊆ P ∗ Q˙ ∗ R˙
is V -generic, then Hc ≺ H
V [G∗g∗h]
c . Restricting this to the countable sets,
it follows that Hω1 ≺ H
V [G∗g∗h]
ω1 . Let R2 = Add(ω1, 1)
V [G∗g∗h] be further
forcing to recover the CH once again, and suppose h2 ⊆ R2 is V [G ∗ g ∗ h]-
generic. Since P adds no reals over V and R2 adds no reals over V [G∗g ∗h],
we have Hω1 = H
V [G]
ω1 and H
V [G∗g∗h]
ω1 = H
V [G∗g∗h∗h2]
ω1 . In other words, we
have H
V [G]
ω1 ≺ H
V [G][g∗h∗h2]
ω1 . Since ω1 = c in both V [G] and V [G∗ g ∗h∗h2],
this witnesses RA(proper) in V [G], as desired. An identical argument works
with axiom-A forcing, semi-proper forcing, forcing that preserves stationary
subsets of ω1, and with any class Γ necessarily closed under finite iterations
and containing a poset forcing CH without adding reals. 
In the case of c.c.c. forcing, we get a dramatic failure of CH:
Theorem 7. The resurrection axiom RA(ccc) implies that the continuum
c is a weakly inaccessible cardinal, even weakly hyper-inaccessible, a limit
of such cardinals and so on. In particular, RA(ccc) implies that CH fails
spectacularly.
Proof. Assume RA(ccc). By theorem 4, it follows that MA holds and so c
is regular. Let Q = Add(ω, c+) be the forcing to add c+ many Cohen reals.
By RA(ccc), there is further c.c.c. forcing R˙ such that if g ∗ h ⊆ Q ∗ R˙ is
V -generic, then Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c . Since V [g ∗ h] is a c.c.c. extension, cardinals
are preserved and cV is a cardinal less than cV [g∗h], and therefore an element
of H
V [g∗h]
c . The continuum c cannot be a successor cardinal in V , since
otherwise c = δ+ for some δ < c and Hc would see that δ is the largest
cardinal, but H
V [g∗h]
c would not agree. Thus, c is a regular limit cardinal,
and hence weakly inaccessible. It must be a limit of such cardinals, that
is, weakly 1-inaccessible, because if the weakly inaccessible cardinals below
c were bounded by some γ < c, then by elementarity, this would also be
true in H
V [g∗h]
c , contradicting the fact that c
V remains weakly inaccessible
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in the c.c.c. extension V [g ∗ h]. Essentially the same argument shows that c
is weakly α-inaccessible for every α < c—so it is weakly hyper-inaccessible—
and it is a limit of such cardinals, and so on. 
Although RA(ccc) remains compatible with much stronger properties for
the continuum c, we cannot expect to strengthen the conclusion of theorem
7 to assert, for example, that c is weakly Mahlo, while still assuming only
ZFC+RA(ccc) in the hypothesis, since this would imply that it is a Mahlo
cardinal in L, but this already exceeds the consistency strength of RA(ccc)
by theorem 21, which shows it to be equiconsistent with an uplifting cardinal
and therefore strictly weaker than the existence of a Mahlo cardinal.
We pointed out after theorem 5 that under projective absoluteness, then
also RA(all) and CH are equivalent. The next theorem provides instances
of resurrection that are outright equivalent to CH.
Theorem 8. The following are equivalent:
(1) the continuum hypothesis CH
(2) RA(countably closed)
(3) RA(countably distributive)
(4) RA(does not add reals)
(5) wRA(does not add reals)
(6) wRA(countably distributive)
Proof. We first illustrate the equivalence of statements (1) and (2). For the
forward direction, suppose that CH holds, and that g ⊆ Q is countably
closed forcing. Since Q does not add any new reals, it follows that CH holds
in V [g] and that Hω1 = H
V [g]
ω1 . Consequently Hc = H
V [g]
c , and trivial forcing
h ⊆ R over V [g] yields Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c , as desired. For the backward direction,
assume that RA(countably closed) holds and g ⊆ Q is the canonical poset
to force CH, using countable conditions. The poset Q is countably closed
and forces CH in V [g]. By RA(countably closed) there is further countably
closed forcing h ⊆ R ∈ V [g] such that Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c . Since R does not
add any reals, it follows that CH holds in V [g ∗ h], and consequently by
elementarity CH also holds in V , as desired.
Essentially the same argument establishes the equivalence of CH with (3),
and also with (4). Lastly, note that (4) implies (5), which in turn implies
(6), and we saw earlier in the remarks after theorem 5 that statement (6)
implies (1). 
Suppose that δ ≥ ℵ1 is a regular cardinal, and Γ is a class of forcing
notions necessarily containing a poset which forces c ≤ δ such that posets
in Γ do not add bounded subsets of δ. Then similar arguments as used in
theorem 8 show that c ≤ δ is equivalent to RA(Γ), and they also show that
each of the resurrection axioms RA(<δ-closed) and RA(<δ-distributive) is
equivalent to c ≤ δ.
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We conclude this section by pointing out that some natural-seeming res-
urrection principles are simply inconsistent.
Theorem 9.
(1) RA(δ-c.c.) is inconsistent, for any cardinal δ ≥ ℵ2.
(2) RA(cardinal-preserving) is inconsistent.
(3) RA(cofinality-preserving) is inconsistent.
(4) RA(ℵ1-preserving ∩ ℵ2-preserving) is inconsistent.
Proof. For (1), fix any cardinal δ ≥ ℵ2 and assume RA(δ-c.c). Since the
usual forcing to collapse ℵ1 is ℵ2-c.c., and therefore δ-c.c., it follows by
theorem 5 that CH holds in V . If we force to add g ⊆ Q = Add(ω, δ+), then
all cardinals are preserved and c = δ+ in V [g]. By RA(δ-c.c.) there is further
δ-c.c. forcing h ⊆ R in V [g] such that Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c . Since R preserves the
cardinals δ and δ+ as two distinct uncountable cardinals, it follows that
c ≥ δ+ and consequently that CH fails in V [g ∗ h], a contradiction to the
elementarity Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c .
For (2), assume RA(cardinal-preserving). The weak resurrection axiom
wRA(cofinality-preserving) holds, and so CH holds by our remarks after
theorem 5. Moreover, if we force with g ⊆ Q = Add(ω,ℵ2), then c = ℵ2
in V [g] and the same argument as in theorem 7, but now for any cardinal-
preserving forcing h ⊆ R ∈ V [g] rather than c.c.c. forcing, shows that c ≥ ℵ2
in V [g ∗ h] and thus Hc 6≺ H
V [g∗h]
c , a contradiction.
Statement (3) is proved by the same argument as for (2), but now for
cofinality-preserving forcing notions, and the argument for (4) is similar
also, since again CH holds in V , and if g ⊆ Q = Add(ω,ℵ2) is V -generic,
then it suffices to know that R ∈ V [g] preserves the cardinals ℵ1 and ℵ2
to conclude that c ≥ ℵ2 in V [g ∗ h] and therefore that Hc 6≺ H
V [g∗h]
c , a
contradiction. 
4. The uplifting cardinals
In this section, we introduce the uplifting cardinals. We view the uplifting
cardinals as relatively low in the large cardinal hierarchy, in light of the
bounds provided by theorem 11. Uplifting cardinals relativize to L, and
they have what we call a HOD-anticipating uplifting Laver function, as in
statement (2) of theorem 14. In section 5, we shall show that many instances
of resurrection axioms are equiconsistent with the existence of an uplifting
cardinal.
Definition 10. An inaccessible cardinal κ is uplifting if for every ordinal θ it
is θ-uplifting, meaning that there is an inaccessible γ ≥ θ such that Vκ ≺ Vγ
is a proper elementary extension. An inaccessible cardinal is pseudo uplifting
if for every ordinal θ it is pseudo θ-uplifting, meaning that there is a cardinal
γ ≥ θ such that Vκ ≺ Vγ is a proper elementary extension, without insisting
that γ is inaccessible.
10 HAMKINS AND JOHNSTONE
It is an elementary exercise to see that if Vκ ≺ Vγ is a proper elementary
extension, then κ and hence also γ are i-fixed points, and so Vκ = Hκ and
Vγ = Hγ . It follows that a cardinal κ is uplifting if and only if it is regular
and there are arbitrarily large regular cardinals γ such that Hκ ≺ Hγ . It
is also easy to see that every uplifting cardinal κ is uplifting in L, with
the same targets. Namely, if Vκ ≺ Vγ , then we may simply restrict to the
constructible sets to obtain V Lκ = L
Vκ ≺ LVγ = V Lγ . An analogous result
holds for pseudo uplifting cardinals.
The Le´vy scheme is the theory “Vδ≺V + δ is inaccessible,” which is for-
malized in the language of set theory augmented with a constant symbol for
δ, consisting of the axioms ∀x ∈ Vδ [ϕ(x)↔ ϕ
Vδ (x)], plus the assertion that
δ is inaccessible. The Le´vy scheme has figured in various other consistency
results, such as the boldface maximality principle MP(R), as in [Ham03] or
[SV02]. The Le´vy scheme implies the theory “Ord is Mahlo”, the scheme as-
serting of every definable closed unbounded class of ordinals that it contains
a regular cardinal, and a simple compactness argument shows that these two
theories are equiconsistent. The consistency strength of the existence of an
uplifting cardinal is bounded above and below by:
Theorem 11.
(1) If δ is a Mahlo cardinal, then Vδ has a proper class of uplifting car-
dinals.
(2) Every uplifting cardinal is pseudo uplifting and a limit of pseudo
uplifting cardinals.
(3) If there is a pseudo uplifting cardinal, or indeed, merely a pseudo
0-uplifting cardinal, then there is a transitive set model of ZFC+ the
Le´vy scheme, and consequently a transitive model of ZFC + Ord is
Mahlo.
Proof. For (1), suppose that δ is a Mahlo cardinal. By the Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem theorem, there is a club set C ⊆ δ of cardinals β with Vβ ≺ Vδ. Since
δ is Mahlo, the club C contains unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals.
If κ < γ are both in C, then Vκ ≺ Vγ , as desired. Similarly, for (2), if κ
is uplifting, then κ is pseudo uplifting and if Vκ ≺ Vγ with γ inaccessible,
then there are unboundedly many ordinals β < γ with Vβ ≺ Vγ and hence
Vκ ≺ Vβ. So κ is pseudo uplifting in Vγ , and it follows that there must
be unboundedly many pseudo uplifting cardinals below κ. For (3), if κ is
inaccessible and Vκ ≺ Vγ , then Vγ is a transitive set model of ZFC+the Le´vy
scheme, and thus also a model of the scheme “Ord is Mahlo.” 
So the existence of an uplifting cardinal, if consistent, is in consistency
strength strictly between the existence of a Mahlo cardinal and the scheme
“Ord is Mahlo.” We take these bounds both to be rather close together and
also to be rather low in the large cardinal hierarchy. Note that a pseudo
0-uplifting cardinal is the same thing as a 0-extendible cardinal. As a re-
finement of the Le´vy scheme, recall that for any given natural number n,
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an inaccessible cardinal κ is Σn-reflecting if Hκ ≺Σn V . Recall also that
Hκ ≺Σ1 V whenever κ is any uncountable cardinal.
Observation 12.
(1) Every uplifting cardinal is a limit of Σ3-reflecting cardinals, and is
itself Σ3-reflecting.
(2) If κ is the least uplifting cardinal, then κ is not Σ4-reflecting, and
there are no Σ4-reflecting cardinals below κ.
Proof. For (1), suppose that κ is uplifting, and let us first show that κ is Σ3-
reflecting. Thus, assume that V |= ∃xϕ(x, a) for some Π2 formula ϕ(x, y)
and some a ∈ Vκ. Let x0 be a witness such that V |= ϕ(x0, a), and let
γ be any uncountable cardinal with x0 ∈ Vγ such that Vκ ≺ Vγ . Since
Vγ is existentially closed in V , it follows that Π2 formulas are downwards
absolute to Vγ , and so Vγ |= ϕ(x0, a), which implies by elementarity that
Vκ |= ∃xϕ(x, a), as desired; the converse direction is easier. Next, suppose
for contradiction that the set of Σ3-reflecting cardinals is bounded below κ.
Then Vκ sees this bound, since κ is Σ3-reflecting. Thus, if Vκ ≺ Vγ , then Vγ
thinks that the set of Σ3-reflecting cardinals is bounded below κ. But this
is impossible, since κ itself is (much more than) Σ3-reflecting in Vγ .
Statement (2) is an immediate consequence of the fact that the property
of being uplifting is Π3 expressible, and so the existence of an uplifting
cardinal is a Σ4 assertion. 
The analogous observation for pseudo uplifting cardinals holds as well,
namely, every pseudo uplifting cardinal is Σ3-reflecting and a limit of Σ3-
reflecting cardinals; and if κ is the least pseudo uplifting cardinal, then κ is
not Σ4-reflecting, and there are no Σ4-reflecting cardinals below κ.
For an uplifting cardinal κ, we say that a function f ... κ → κ has the
uplifting Menas property for κ if for every ordinal θ there is an inaccessible
cardinal γ above θ and a function f∗ ...γ → γ such that 〈Vκ, f〉 ≺ 〈Vγ , f
∗〉 and
θ ≤ f∗(κ).2 In the cases below where the function f is actually definable in
Vκ, then of course we needn’t add it as a separate predicate to the structure,
and it will suffice that Vκ ≺ Vγ and θ ≤ f
∗(κ), where f∗ is the corresponding
function defined in Vγ .
Theorem 13. Every uplifting cardinal has a function with the Menas prop-
erty. Indeed, there is a class function f ... Ord → Ord such that for every
uplifting cardinal κ, the restriction f ↾ κ ...κ→ κ has the Menas property for
κ, and f ↾ κ is a definable class in Vκ.
Proof. The failure-of-upliftingness function f ... Ord → Ord has the desired
property. Namely, if δ is a cardinal but not uplifting, then let f(δ) be the
2Analogous Menas properties of functions f ...κ → κ are defined for various large cardi-
nals κ, not just for uplifting cardinals (see [Ham00]), and their definitions change depend-
ing on the particular large cardinal in question. However, we will simply refer to it as the
Menas property for κ if it is clear from context which large cardinal property of κ we are
concerned with.
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supremum of the inaccessible cardinals γ for which Vκ ≺ Vγ . If κ is uplifting,
then by the elementarity of Vκ ≺ Vγ for increasingly large γ, it follows that
Vκ correctly computes the value of f(δ) for every δ < κ. In particular,
f(δ) < κ for any non-uplifting cardinal δ < κ, so that f " κ ⊆ κ, and the
restriction f ↾ κ is the failure-of-upliftingness function as defined in Vκ.
To see that f ↾ κ has the Menas property for κ, fix any ordinal θ and
any inaccessible cardinal γ ≥ θ with Vκ ≺ Vγ . Applying the fact that κ is
uplifting again, let λ be the smallest inaccessible cardinal above γ for which
Vκ ≺ Vλ. If f
∗ ... λ → λ is the failure-of-upliftingness function as defined in
Vλ, then since this function is definable, we have 〈Vκ, f〉 ≺ 〈Vλ, f
∗〉. And
because Vλ can see that Vκ ≺ Vγ , but by the minimality of λ can see no
higher inaccessible cardinal to which Vκ extends elementarily, it follows that
f∗(κ) = γ, thereby witnessing the desired Menas property. 
We now strengthen the previous theorem by proving that every uplift-
ing cardinal has functions with certain uplifting Laver properties, properties
that strengthen the uplifting Menas property of theorem 13 significantly.
We shall see in section 5 that the uplifting Menas property suffices to ob-
tain equiconsistency results for instances of resurrection such as RA(all),
RA(proper) + ¬CH, RA(semi-proper) + ¬CH and others, but it does not
seem to suffice to obtain the corresponding result for RA(ccc).
If κ is an uplifting cardinal, define that ℓ ... κ→ Hκ is an uplifting Laver
function for κ, if for every set x there are unboundedly many inaccessible
cardinals γ with a corresponding function ℓ∗ ... γ → Hγ such that 〈Hκ, ℓ〉 ≺
〈Hγ , ℓ
∗〉 and ℓ∗(κ) = x. Following the scheme of axioms in [Ham02], let
us say that the uplifting Laver Diamond ❭
uplift
κ holds at κ when there is
such a function ℓ ... κ → Hκ. For a natural weakening of this concept, we
say that ℓ ... κ → κ is an ordinal-anticipating uplifting Laver function for κ,
if for every ordinal β there are unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals γ
with a corresponding function ℓ∗ ... γ → γ such that 〈Hκ, ℓ〉 ≺ 〈Hγ , ℓ
∗〉 and
ℓ∗(κ) = β. Similarly, we have the concept of a HOD-anticipating uplifting
Laver function, where we can achieve ℓ∗(κ) = x for any x ∈ HOD.
We think of the uplifting Laver functions as in statement (3) of the fol-
lowing theorem as the world’s smallest Laver functions, in light of the fact
that uplifting is weaker than Mahlo.
Theorem 14.
(1) Every uplifting cardinal κ has an ordinal-anticipating uplifting Laver
function ℓ ... κ→ κ definable in Hκ.
(2) Every uplifting cardinal κ has a HOD-anticipating uplifting Laver
function ℓ ... κ→ Hκ definable in Hκ.
(3) If V = HOD, then every uplifting cardinal κ has an uplifting Laver
function ℓ ... κ→ Hκ definable in Hκ.
Proof. For (1), working in Hκ, define that ℓ(δ) = β, if δ is a cardinal and
the collection of inaccessible cardinals ξ above δ with Hδ ≺ Hξ has order
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type exactly θ + β for some infinite cardinal θ for which β < θ. (Note that
the decomposition θ+ β is unique.) To see that ℓ is an ordinal-anticipating
uplifting Laver function, fix any ordinal β and any infinite cardinal θ above
β. Since κ is uplifting, there are unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals
ξ > κ with Hκ ≺ Hξ. Let γ be the (θ + β)
th such ξ. In this case, there are
precisely θ+β many such ξ insideHγ withHκ ≺ Hξ, and so ℓ
∗(κ) = β, where
ℓ∗ is defined in Hγ just as ℓ is defined in Hκ. The elementarity Hκ ≺ Hγ
extends to 〈Hκ, ℓ〉 ≺ 〈Hλ, ℓ
∗〉, because ℓ is definable, witnessing the desired
instance of the Laver property.
For (2), let f ... κ→ κ be an ordinal-anticipating uplifting Laver function,
definable in Hκ, as in statement (1). Define that ℓ(δ) = x, if f(δ) = 〈θ, β〉
is the ordinal code for a pair of ordinals, such that x is ordinal definable
in Vθ and x is the β
th element of HODVθ using the definable well-ordering
of HOD inside Vθ. To see that ℓ is a HOD-anticipating uplifting Laver
function, suppose that x ∈ HOD. It follows by reflection that x is in the
HOD of some Vθ and is the β
th element of HODVθ for some β. Since f is
an ordinal-anticipating uplifting Laver function, there are arbitrarily large
inaccessible cardinals γ for which Vκ ≺ Vγ and f
∗(κ) = 〈θ, β〉, where f∗ is
defined in Vγ by the same definition of f in Vκ. By construction, we have
ℓ∗(κ) = x, where ℓ∗ is defined in Vγ in analogy with ℓ in Vκ, witnessing the
desired instance of the Laver property.
Statement (3) is immediate from (2). 
Just as with theorem 13, the proof of (1) shows that there is a global
ordinal-anticipating uplifting Laver function, a class function ℓ ... Ord→ Ord
such that for every uplifting cardinal κ the restriction ℓ ↾ κ ... κ → κ is an
ordinal-anticipating uplifting Laver function for κ, and ℓ ↾ κ is definable in
Hκ. The proof of (2) shows that there is a global HOD-anticipating uplifting
Laver function, defined accordingly. Statement (3) asserts that V = HOD
implies ❭
uplift
κ for every uplifting cardinal κ. Following [Ham02], we define
❭
uplift
to be the assertion that there is a global uplifting Laver function,
a class function ℓ ... Ord → V such that for every uplifting cardinal κ the
restriction ℓ ↾ κ ... κ → Hκ is an uplifting Laver function for κ, and ℓ ↾ κ is
definable in Hκ. We have thus proved that V = HOD implies ❭
uplift
.
Question 15. Can there be an uplifting cardinal with no uplifting Laver
function? In other words, is it consistent that κ is uplifting + ¬❭
uplift
κ ?
Although we have proved that an uplifting cardinal can have a Laver
function, we would like to remark that there is no analogue here of the Laver
preparation that makes an uplifting cardinal Laver indestructible, because
the main result of [BHTU] shows that uplifting cardinals and even pseudo
uplifting cardinals are never Laver indestructible.
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5. The exact large cardinal strength of the resurrection
axioms
In this section, we prove that many instances of the resurrection axioms,
including RA(all), RA(ccc), RA(proper)+¬CH and others, are each equicon-
sistent with the existence of an uplifting cardinal. The proof outline proceeds
in two directions: on the one hand, theorem 16 shows that many instances
of the (weak) resurrection axioms imply that cV is uplifting in L; and con-
versely, given any uplifting cardinal κ, we may perform a suitable lottery
iteration of Γ forcing to obtain the resurrection axiom for Γ in a forcing
extension with κ = c. The main result is stated in theorem 21.
Theorem 16.
(1) RA(all) implies that cV is uplifting in L.
(2) RA(ccc) implies that cV is uplifting in L.
(3) wRA(countably closed) + ¬CH implies that cV is uplifting in L.
(4) Under ¬CH, the weak resurrection axioms for the classes of axiom-A
forcing, proper forcing, semi-proper forcing, and posets that preserve
stationary subsets of ω1, respectively, each imply that c
V is uplifting
in L.
Proof. For (1), suppose that RA(all) holds. Then CH holds by theorem 5.
Let κ = c = ω1. To see that κ is uplifting in L, it suffices by the remarks
after definition 10 to show that κ is regular in L, and that HLκ ≺ H
L
γ for
arbitrarily large ordinals γ that are regular cardinals in L. The cardinal
κ is regular and therefore regular in L. Thus, fix any cardinal α > κ,
and let Q be a poset that collapses α to ℵ0. By RA(all), there is further
forcing R˙, such that if g ∗ h ⊆ Q ∗ R˙ is V -generic, then Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c . Let
γ = cV [g∗h]. Since α was made countable in V [g], it follows that α < γ. Since
Hc believes that every ordinal is countable, this is also true by elementarity
in H
V [g∗h]]
c , and so CH holds in V [g ∗ h]. It follows that γ = ω
V [g∗h]
1 , and
so γ is regular in V [g ∗ h] and therefore also in L, with κ < α < γ and
HVκ ≺ H
V [g∗h]
γ . By relativizing formulas to the constructible sets, it follows
that HLκ = (H
V
κ ∩ L) ≺ (H
V [g∗h]
γ ∩ L) = HLγ , as desired.
For (2), suppose that RA(ccc) holds, and let κ = c. By theorem 7, we
know that κ is weakly inaccessible and therefore inaccessible in L. Again,
fix any cardinal α > κ and let Q = Add(ω,α) be now the forcing that adds
α many Cohen reals. By RA(ccc) there is further c.c.c. forcing R˙ such that
if g ∗ h ⊆ Q ∗ R˙ is V -generic, then Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c . Since c
V [g] ≥ α > κ and
R does not collapse cardinals, it follows that cV [g∗h] ≥ α > κ. Since MA
holds in Hc, it holds in H
V [g∗h]
c by elementarity, and hence also in V [g ∗ h].
It follows that cV [g∗h] is regular in V [g ∗ h] and hence in L. By relativizing
formulas to L it follows again that HLκ ≺ H
L
γ , where γ = c
V [g∗h], as desired.
For (3), suppose that wRA(countably closed) holds and CH fails. Then
c = ℵ2 by theorem 5. Let κ = c = ℵ2, which is regular and therefore
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regular in L. Again, fix any cardinal α > κ and let Q be the count-
ably closed forcing that collapses α to ℵ1 using countable conditions. By
wRA(countably closed) there is R˙, such that if g ∗ h ⊆ Q ∗ R˙ is V -generic,
then Hc ≺ H
V [g∗h]
c . Since ℵ
V
1 is the largest cardinal in the former structure,
this must also be true in H
V [g∗h]
c , and so c = ℵ
V [g∗h]
2 . As α is an ordinal of
size ℵ1 in V [g], and thus in V [g ∗ h], it follows that c
V [g∗h] > α. If we let
γ = cV [g∗h] = ℵ
V [g∗h]
2 , then γ is a regular cardinal above α in V [g ∗ h] and
hence in L, and by relativizing formulas to L it follows again that HLκ ≺ H
L
γ ,
as desired. Statement (4) is an immediate consequence of (3), since count-
ably closed forcing is included in all those other classes of forcing. 
The failure of CH is a necessary assumption in statement (3) of theo-
rem 16, because wRA(countably closed) holds in L by theorem 8, but cL is
of course not uplifting in L. And it is similarly required in statement (4),
since in the case of proper forcing, for instance, if κ is an uplifting cardinal
in L, we shall see later by first applying theorem 18 and then theorem 6 that
there is a proper forcing extension L[G] of L satisfying RA(proper) + CH,
but cL[G] is not uplifting in L as cL[G] = ℵ
L[G]
1 = ℵ
L
1 .
We now turn to the converse consistency implications, producing models
of RA(Γ) for various natural forcing classes Γ from models with an uplifting
cardinal. In order to produce models of RA(Γ), our main tool will be to
undertake various instances of what we call a lottery iteration, a forcing
iteration in which each stage of forcing performs a lottery sum. The idea goes
back to the lottery preparation of Hamkins [Ham00], which was introduced
as an alternative to the Laver preparation in order to make large cardinals
indestructible in situations where there is no Laver function.
Specifically, if A is a collection of partial orders, the lottery sum of A,
denoted ⊕A, is the partial order {〈Q, q〉 | q ∈ Q ∈ A} ∪ {1l}, ordered
with 1l above everything and 〈Q, q〉 ≤ 〈P, p〉 if and only if Q = P and
q ≤Q p. Forcing with ⊕A amounts to choosing a winning poset from A
and then forcing with it. (See [Ham00]; the lottery sum is also commonly
known as side-by-side forcing, and it is forcing equivalent to the Boolean
product, without omitting 0, of the corresponding Boolean algebras.) A
lottery iteration is any forcing iteration in which each stage of forcing is the
lottery sum of a collection of forcing notions. For any definable class Γ of
forcing notions and any f ... κ→ κ, the lottery iteration of Γ forcing, relative
to f , is the iteration of length κ (with some specified support) that forces
at stage β ∈ dom(f) with the lottery sum of all posets Q in ΓV [Gβ ] having
hereditary size at most f(β), and trivial forcing at stages β /∈ dom(f).
More generally, when we have a notion of what it means to be allowed at
stage β, that is, if we have definable classes Γβ of forcing notions, then the
corresponding lottery iteration forces at stage β ∈ dom(f) with the lottery
sum of all Q ∈ Γ
V [Gβ ]
β of hereditary size at most f(β), and again trivial
forcing at stages β /∈ dom(f). Although one could incorporate the size
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restriction imposed by f(β) into the definition of Γβ, it is more convenient
to consider these as separate restrictions, one restriction on the type of
forcing and another on the size of the forcing.
Just as the lottery preparation of a cardinal κ relative to a function f ...
κ → κ works best when f exhibits a certain fast-growth behavior, called
the Menas property in [Ham00], the same is true of the lottery iterations
considered here; and we proved in theorem 13 that every uplifting cardinal
has a function with the Menas property.
The lottery preparation of [Ham00], for example, is the Easton-support
lottery iteration of length κ, relative to a function f ...κ→ κ with the Menas
property, where posets are allowed at inaccessible stage β exactly if they
are strategically δ-closed for every δ < β. In this article, we shall similarly
perform the countable-support lottery iteration of proper forcing, relative to
a Menas function f ... κ → κ, as well as a similar lottery iteration of axiom-
A forcing and a revised-countable-support lottery iteration of semi-proper
forcing, among others.
A countable-support lottery iteration of proper posets was first employed
in the second author’s dissertation [Joh07], where he used it to prove the rel-
ative consistency of a certain fragment of PFA from a weaker-than-expected
large cardinal hypothesis. Similar lottery iterations appear also in [HJ09], in-
cluding the revised-countable-support lottery iteration of semi-proper posets,
which appears independently in [NS08].
Given an uplifting cardinal κ and a corresponding elementary extension
Hκ ≺ Hγ for some inaccessible γ > κ, we shall use the next lemma to force
with some poset G ⊆ P ⊆ Hκ and lift the elementarity to Hκ[G] ≺ Hγ [G
∗],
which will turn out in our case to be the same as H
V [G]
c ≺ H
V [G][g∗h]
c , which
will thereby witness an instance of the resurrection axiom. Since P will be
class forcing from the point of view of Hκ, rather than set forcing, there will
be some complications that we must analyze.
If M |= ZFC and A ⊆M , then we shall say that the expanded structure
〈M,∈, A〉 satisfies ZFC to mean that it satisfies the version of ZFC in which
we allow a predicate symbols for the class A to be used in instances of the
replacement and separation axioms; this theory is also sometimes denoted
ZFC(A). Define that a forcing notion P ⊆ M is nice for class forcing over
M = 〈M,∈, A〉, if P is definable in M, the corresponding forcing relations
are definable inM and the truth lemma—asserting that a statement is true
in a forcing extension exactly if it is forced by a condition in the generic
filter—holds for forcing with P over M.
Suppose that M ≺ M∗ for some model M∗ = 〈M∗,∈, A∗〉 with M∗
transitive and A∗ ⊆M∗, and suppose also that P∗ ⊆M∗ is the analogously
defined class in M∗. If P is nice for class forcing over M, then we say that
the niceness of P is preserved to M∗ if P∗ is nice for class forcing over M∗
and the forcing relations for forcing with P∗ over M∗ are defined in M∗ by
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the same formulas and same parameters as those for forcing with P over M
are defined in M.
Lemma 17 (Lifting Lemma). Suppose that 〈M,∈, A〉 ≺ 〈M∗,∈, A∗〉 are
transitive models of ZFC, that P is a definable class in 〈M,∈, A〉 that is nice
for forcing and that the niceness of P is preserved to the analogous class
P∗ defined in 〈M∗,∈, A∗〉. If G ⊆ P is an M -generic filter and G∗ ⊆ P is
M∗-generic with G = G∗ ∩ P, then 〈M [G],∈, A,G〉 ≺ 〈M∗[G∗],∈, A∗, G∗〉.
Proof. Suppose that M = 〈M,∈, A〉 and M∗ = 〈M∗,∈, A∗〉 are as in the
statement of the lemma, with the partial orders P and P∗ as stated there,
with generic filters G ⊆ P and G∗ ⊆ P∗ as supposed. If τ is any P-name
in M , then τ is also a P∗-name in M∗, and a simple ∈-induction shows
that τG = τG∗ . To see that 〈M [G],∈, A,G〉 ≺ 〈M
∗[G∗],∈, A∗, G∗〉, suppose
that 〈M [G],∈, A,G〉 |= ϕ[τG] for some P-name τ and some formula ϕ in
the extended language of set theory with two unary predicate symbols. It
suffices to show that 〈M∗[G∗],∈, A∗, G∗〉 |= ϕ[τG]. Since P is nice for class
forcing over M, there exists some condition p ∈ G such that p P ϕ(τ),
and this statement is definable in M. Since the niceness of P is preserved
to M∗, the forcing relations for P and P∗ are analogously defined in M and
M∗, respectively, and it follows by elementarity that p P∗ ϕ(τ) for forcing
over M∗. Since p ∈ G∗ this means 〈M∗[G∗],∈, A∗, G∗〉 |= ϕ[τG∗ ], as desired
since τG = τG∗ . 
If P ⊆ M is a definable chain of complete subposets3 in some transitive
model M |= ZFC, then it is a standard result in the theory of class forcing
that P is nice for class forcing overM , and that the niceness of P is preserved
to M∗ whenever M ≺M∗ for some transitive model M∗. Consequently,
lemma 17 is widely applicable as many class partial orderings can be written
as a chain of complete subposets, and it applies for instance to the special
case when the partial order P is an Ord-length forcing iteration in M , since
every initial part of the iteration embeds completely into the later stages.
Theorem 18. If κ is an uplifting cardinal, then the countable-support lottery
iteration of proper forcing, defined relative to a Menas function f ... κ → κ,
forces RA(proper) and c = κ = ℵ2.
Proof. Suppose that κ is uplifting and f ... κ → κ is a function with the
Menas property for κ, such as the function of theorem 13. Let P be the
countable-support lottery iteration of proper forcing defined relative to f .
That is, P is the countable-support κ-iteration, where the forcing at stage
β ∈ dom(f) is the lottery sum in V [Gβ ] of all proper posets in H
V [Gβ ]
f(β)+
. We
defined the iteration P in V relative to f , but as κ is inaccessible it follows by
absoluteness that P is the same as the corresponding class lottery iteration
3A class partial order P is a chain of complete subposets if there is a class 〈Pξ | ξ < Ord〉
of partially ordered sets Pξ such that P =
⋃
ξ∈Ord Pξ and Pξ is a complete subposet of Pη
whenever ξ ≤ η. See for instance [Rei06].
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of proper posets, relative to f , as defined in 〈Hκ, f〉. Since initial stages of
P completely embed into later stages, it follows that P is a definable chain
of complete subposets in 〈Hκ, f〉. Since the lottery sum of any number
of proper forcing notions is still proper, it follows that P is a countable-
support iteration of proper posets and therefore is itself proper. A standard
∆-system argument shows that P is κ-c.c. Suppose that G ⊆ P is V -generic.
A simple density argument shows that κ becomes ω
V [G]
2 , because both ℵ1
and κ are preserved, but all cardinals of V between ℵ1 and κ have plenty
of opportunity to be collapsed. Similarly, κ = c in V [G], since the generic
filter will opt to add reals at unboundedly many stages of the forcing. Thus
κ = c = ℵ2 in V [G], and it remains to prove that V [G] |= RA(proper).
Suppose that Q is any proper notion of forcing in V [G], and let Q˙ be a
name for Q that necessarily yields a proper poset. Since f has the Menas
property for the uplifting cardinal κ, there is an inaccessible cardinal γ above
κ such that 〈Hκ, f〉 ≺ 〈Hγ , f
∗〉 with f∗(κ) ≥ |trcl(Q˙)|. Thus, the poset Q
appears in the stage κ lottery of the corresponding countable-support class
lottery iteration P∗ of proper posets, relative to f∗, as defined in 〈Hγ , f
∗〉.
Notice that P and P∗ agree on the stages below κ, and so below a condition
opting for Q at stage κ, we may factor P∗ as P ∗ Q˙ ∗ Ptail. Let g ∗ h ⊆
Q ∗Ptail be V [G]-generic. It follows that G∗ g ∗h generates a V -generic filter
G∗ ⊆ P∗. Since G and G∗ agree on the first κ many stages, it follows by
lemma 17 that Hκ ≺ Hγ lifts to Hκ[G] ≺ Hγ [G
∗]. Since P is κ-c.c. and κ is
regular, we may use nice names for bounded subsets of κ to see that Hκ[G] =
Hκ
V [G]. Since κ = c in V [G], it follows in summary that Hκ[G] = H
V [G]
c .
Arguing analogously for the poset P∗ and the regular cardinal γ, we see that
Hγ [G
∗] = H
V [G∗]
γ = H
V [G∗]
c and the desired elementarity H
V [G]
c ≺ H
V [G][g∗h]
c
follows. Lastly, Ptail is a countable-support class iteration of proper posets
in Hγ [G ∗ g] = H
V [G∗g]
γ , and consequently a proper poset in V [G ∗ g] by
absoluteness. This completes the proof. 
The method of proof in theorem 18 is flexible and can be applied to
many classes Γ of forcing notions, as long as lottery sums of posets in Γ are
themselves in Γ, and a suitable preservation theorem holds for iterations of
posets in Γ. For example, we obtain the following:
Theorem 19. Let κ be an uplifting cardinal and f ... κ→ κ a function with
the uplifting Menas property for κ. Then
(1) the countable-support lottery iteration of axiom-A forcing, relative to
f , forces RA(axiom-A) and c = κ = ℵ2.
(2) the revised-countable-support lottery iteration of semi-proper forcing,
relative to f , forces RA(semi-proper) and c = κ = ℵ2.
(3) the finite-support lottery iteration of all forcing, relative to f , forces
RA(all) and c = κ = ℵ1.
Proof. For (1), note that the lottery sum of any number of axiom-A posets
continues to have axiom-A, and Koszmider’s result [Kos93] shows that a
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countable-support iteration of axiom-A forcing notions has itself axiom-A.
It is then straightforward to follow the proof of theorem 18 closely to obtain
statement (1).
For (2), note that the lottery sum of semi-proper posets is still semi-
proper, and semi-properness is preserved under iterations with revised count-
able support, by a result due to Shelah. Replacing the countable-support
lottery iteration of proper posets in the proof of theorem 18 by a revised-
countable-support lottery iteration of semi-proper posets therefore proves
statement (2).
For statement (3), to produce a forcing extension V [G] that satisfies the
resurrection axiom RA(all), we allow every poset at each stage of the lottery
iteration. Thus, following the proof of theorem 18 but using a finite-support
lottery iteration of all posets shows that the uplifting cardinal κ will turn
into ℵ
V [G]
1 , since κ is preserved but all uncountable cardinals below κ are
collapsed, and statement (3) follows. 
We would like to call attention to the fact that the poset used in state-
ment (3) of theorem 19 —the finite-support lottery iteration of all posets,
relative to a function f ... κ→ κ with the uplifting Menas property—has size
κ, is κ-c.c., and necessarily collapses all cardinals below κ to ω. Standard
arguments show that this poset is hence forcing equivalent to the Le´vy col-
lapse Coll(ω,<κ), and an alternative formulation of (3) would state that the
Le´vy collapse Coll(ω,<κ) of an uplifting cardinal κ forces RA(all).
For countable ordinals α, Shelah [She82], introduced the notion of an
α-proper poset as a strengthening of properness, and he showed that α-
properness is preserved under countable-support iterations. Analogously to
the other examples in theorem 19, it follows that the countable-support
lottery iteration of α-proper posets, relative to a function f ...κ→ κ with the
Menas property for κ, forces RA(α-proper) with c = κ = ℵ2.
The lottery iteration method does not seem to work directly in the case
of c.c.c. forcing, simply because an uncountable lottery sum of c.c.c. forcing
is no longer c.c.c. If one were to try to perform a finite-support lottery
preparation of c.c.c. forcing, the iteration itself would no longer be c.c.c.,
and indeed it would collapse ω1. The argument would break down in the
step where, in attempt to verify RA(ccc), we seek to use the tail forcing Ptail
as the resurrection R˙ forcing, since this would not be c.c.c. as required.
Nevertheless, we can carry out a modified argument, using the method
of Laver functions rather than lottery sums. Suppose that κ is a cardinal,
ℓ ... κ → Vκ is a function, and Γ is a class of forcing notions. We say that
a forcing notion P is a Laver-style κ-iteration of Γ forcing, defined relative
to ℓ, if P is a forcing iteration of length κ (with some specified support)
that forces at stage β ∈ dom(ℓ) with ℓ(β), provided that this is a Pβ-name
for forcing that is forced to be in ΓV [Gβ ]; the forcing is trivial at stages
β /∈ dom(ℓ). Note that any uplifting cardinal is uplifting in L, and by
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theorem 14 has an uplifting Laver function there, as in the hypothesis in the
following theorem.
Theorem 20. If κ is uplifting and ℓ ...κ→ Hκ is an uplifting Laver function,
then the finite-support Laver-style κ-iteration of c.c.c. forcing defined relative
to ℓ forces RA(ccc) with c = κ.
Proof. Suppose that κ is uplifting and ℓ ... κ → Hκ is an uplifting Laver
function for κ. Let P be the corresponding finite-support Laver-style κ-
iteration of c.c.c. forcing defined relative to ℓ. Thus, P forces at stage β with
ℓ(β), provided that ℓ(β) is a Pβ-name that necessarily yields a c.c.c. poset in
V [Gβ ]. Suppose that G ⊆ P is V -generic, and consider the model V [G]. If
Q is some c.c.c. forcing in V [G], let Q˙ ∈ V be a P-name for Q, forced to be
c.c.c. By the Laver function property, there is an inaccessible cardinal γ for
which 〈Hκ, ℓ〉 ≺ 〈Hγ , ℓ
∗〉 and ℓ∗(κ) = Q˙. Note that the definition of P works
inside 〈Hκ, ℓ〉, and so we may let P
∗ be the corresponding iteration as defined
in 〈Hγ , ℓ
∗〉. The forcing notions P and P∗ agree on the stages below κ, and
since ℓ∗(κ) = Q˙ is a P-name forced to be c.c.c., the poset P∗ forces at stage κ
with Q, and P∗ factors as P ∗ Q˙ ∗Ptail, where Ptail is the forcing after stage κ.
Suppose that g∗h ⊆ Q∗Ptail is V [G]-generic, so that G∗g∗h is V -generic for
P∗. Thus, by lemma 17 we may lift Hκ ≺ Hγ to Hκ[G] ≺ Hγ [G][g ∗h]. Since
P is c.c.c. and κ = c in V [G], it follows that Hκ[G] = H
V [G]
c ; an analogous
argument for P∗ shows that Hγ [G][g ∗ h] = H
V [G][g][h]
c and consequently
H
V [G]
c ≺ H
V [G][g∗h]
c . Since Ptail is a finite support iteration of c.c.c. forcing
in V [G][g], it is c.c.c., and so we have established RA(ccc) in V [G]. 
The method of proof in theorem 20 is general, and it applies, for example,
to the classes Γ considered in theorems 18 and 19, providing alternative
proofs of those theorems. For instance, if κ is uplifting and ❭
uplift
κ holds
at κ, then the countable-support Laver-style κ-iteration of proper forcing,
defined relative to a corresponding Laver function, forces RA(proper) with
c = κ = ℵ2.
In summary, the previous theorems establish our main result:
Main Theorem 21. The following theories are equiconsistent over ZFC:
(1) There is an uplifting cardinal.
(2) RA(all)
(3) RA(ccc)
(4) RA(semi-proper) + ¬CH
(5) RA(proper) + ¬CH
(6) for some countable ordinal α, RA(α-proper) + ¬CH
(7) RA(axiom-A) + ¬CH
(8) wRA(semi-proper) + ¬CH
(9) wRA(proper) + ¬CH
(10) for some countable ordinal α, wRA(α-proper) + ¬CH
(11) wRA(axiom-A) + ¬CH
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(12) wRA(countably closed) + ¬CH
Note that the axiom RA(preserving stationary subsets of ω1) + ¬CH is
not mentioned in the theorem, and neither is its weakening to the axiom
wRA(preserving stationary subsets of ω1) + ¬CH. The reason is that each
of these axioms implies BMM by theorem 4, but BMM has much higher con-
sistency strength than an uplifting cardinal, as it implies the existence of an
inner model with a strong cardinal, by a result due to Schindler [Sch06]. We
prove the relative consistency of RA(preserving stationary subsets of ω1) +
¬CH in the next section in theorem 22.
6. Resurrection axioms and PFA, SPFA, MM, and their
fragments
The methods of the previous section lend themselves to be combined with
standard techniques to produce models of the proper forcing axiom PFA
and the semi-proper forcing axiom SPFA, starting with a supercompact
cardinal, as well as with techniques used by Tadatoshi Miyamoto in [Miy98]
and also by the authors of this article in [HJ09] to produce models of certain
fragments of PFA and SPFA, starting with a strongly unfoldable cardinal.
We will also obtain instances of resurrection axioms in models of Martin’s
Maximum MM, or of the axiom-A forcing axiom AAFA.
Suppose that κ is a supercompact cardinal. By Laver’s result [Lav78],
there is a supercompactness Laver function ℓ ... κ → Hκ. Laver’s function
does not seem in general to be definable in Hκ, although one can find such
a definable Laver function when Hκ has a definable well-ordering. In the
general case, we shall consider instead the failure-of-supercompactness func-
tion f ... κ → Ord, which maps every non-supercompact cardinal γ < κ to
the least λ such that γ is not λ-supercompact. It is easy to see that f is
definable in Hκ and that f is a supercompactness Menas function, meaning
that for every ordinal θ there is an elementary embedding j : V →M with
critical point κ and Mθ ⊆M and j(κ) ≥ θ such that j(f)(κ) ≥ θ.
Suppose now that κ is a supercompact cardinal that is also uplifting.
Since this implies the existence of many large cardinals above κ, the overall
consistency strength of this hypothesis is strictly above that of a supercom-
pact cardinal, although the proof of theorem 11 shows that it is bounded
above by a stationary set of supercompact cardinals. Let f1
... κ→ κ be the
failure-of-supercompactness function as discussed above, and f2
... κ → κ be
any uplifting Menas function, such as the failure-of-upliftingness function
as in theorem 13, and let f = max(f1, f2). Since f1 is definable in Hκ, it
follows that f ... κ → κ is a Menas function both for upliftingness and for
supercompactness, exactly as is needed for the next theorem.
Theorem 22. Suppose that κ is both supercompact and uplifting and that
f ... κ → κ is a function with the Menas property for both supercompactness
and upliftingness. Then
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(1) the countable-support lottery iteration of proper forcing, relative to
f , forces RA(proper) + PFA.
(2) the countable-support lottery iteration of axiom-A forcing, relative to
f , forces RA(axiom-A) + AAFA.
(3) the revised-countable-support lottery iteration of semi-proper forc-
ing, relative to f , forces RA(preserving stationary subsets of ω1) +
RA(semi-proper) +MM.
Proof. For (1), the resurrection axiom RA(proper) holds by theorem 18, and
the verification of PFA is essentially the Baumgartner argument, but using
the lottery iteration in place of his Laver-style iteration (for a proof see the-
orem 12 in [HJ09]). The proof of statement (2) is essentially the same,
using theorem 19. To prove statement (3), note that the forcing exten-
sion satisfies both SPFA and RA(semi-proper), by the analogous argument
of (1) applied to the semi-proper case. Since Shelah [She87] showed that
SPFA implies that every poset which preserves stationary subsets of ω1 is
semi-proper, it follows that MM if and only if SPFA and consequently that
RA(preserving stationary subsets of ω1) holds in the forcing extension, as
desired. 
The same method shows for any α < ω1 that the countable-support lot-
tery iteration of α-proper forcing, relative to a function f ... κ → κ with
the Menas property for both supercompactness and upliftingness, forces
RA(α-proper) and the forcing axiom FA(α-proper).
Strongly unfoldable cardinals were introduced by Villaveces [Vil98] to
exhibit a miniature form of strongness, and they were introduced indepen-
dently by Miyamoto in [Miy98] as the Hκ+-reflecting cardinals by an equiv-
alent characterization exhibiting a miniature form of supercompactness (see
also [Ham01, DH06]). They lie relatively low in the large cardinal hierarchy,
somewhat above the weakly compact cardinals; their consistency strength
is bounded below by the totally indescribable cardinals and above by the
subtle cardinals, and they relativize to L. One of the main results in [CGHS]
shows that the least weakly compact cardinal can be unfoldable. For a de-
tailed account of strongly unfoldable cardinals and their indestructibility
properties, we may refer the reader to our article [HJ10], and for a quick
review of these cardinals to [HJ09]. There, we used a strongly unfoldable
cardinal κ and a countable-support lottery iteration of proper forcing, which
we called the PFA lottery preparation, to establish the relative consistency of
several fragments of PFA and SPFA. Just as with supercompact cardinals,
the failure-of-strong-unfoldability function f ... κ → κ for a strongly unfold-
able cardinal κ has the strong-unfoldability Menas property for κ, and it is
definable in Hκ (see details in [HJ09]).
Following [HJ09], let us review the relevant concepts used in theorem 23.
If Γ is a class of posets, than the forcing axiom PFA(Γ) is the assertion
that for any proper poset Q ∈ Γ and every collection A of at most ℵ1 many
maximal antichains in Q, there is a filter on Q meeting each antichain in
RESURRECTION AXIOMS AND UPLIFTING CARDINALS 23
A. If δ is a cardinal, then the forcing axiom PFAδ is the assertion that for
any proper complete Boolean algebra B and any collection D of at most
ℵ1 many maximal antichains in B \ {0}, each antichain of size at most δ,
there is a filter on B meeting each antichain in A. A forcing notion Q is
δ-preserving if forcing with Q does not collapse δ as a cardinal. A forcing
notion Q is δ-covering if whenever G ⊆ Q is V -generic and A ∈ V [G] is a set
of ordinals with |A|V [G] < δ, then there is a cover B ∈ V such that A ⊆ B
and |B|V < δ. Note that for any cardinal δ, every δ-covering forcing notion
is necessarily δ-preserving.
Theorem 23. Suppose that κ is strongly unfoldable and let P be the countable-
support lottery iteration of proper posets, relative to a function f ... κ → κ
with the Menas property for strong unfoldability. Then:
(1) If κ is uplifting and f has the uplifting Menas property, then P forces
RA(proper)+PFA(ℵ2-covering)+PFA(ℵ3-covering)+PFAc and c =
κ = ℵ2. If 0
♯ does not exist, then P forces the additional axioms
PFA(ℵ2-preserving) and PFA(ℵ3-preserving).
(2) If κ is not uplifting in L, then P forces ¬wRA(countably closed) +
PFA(ℵ2-covering)+PFA(ℵ3-covering)+PFAc with c = κ = ℵ2. If 0
♯
does not exist, then P forces the additional axioms PFA(ℵ2-preserving)
and PFA(ℵ3-preserving).
Proof. The verification of all relevant fragments of PFA in statements (1)
and (2) is exactly what is proved in theorems 3, 4 and 6 of [HJ09]. The
resurrection axiom RA(proper) with c = κ = ℵ2 holds in statement (1) by
theorem 18, but wRA(countably closed) must fail in statement (2), since
otherwise κ would be uplifting in L by theorem 16, a contradiction. 
The hypothesis of statement (1) of theorem 23 is equiconsistent with a
strongly unfoldable uplifting cardinal, since every such cardinal is strongly
unfoldable and uplifting in L, and so we may work in L, where 0♯ does
not exist, if necessary. The hypothesis of statement (2) of theorem 23 is
equiconsistent with a strongly unfoldable cardinal, since if κ is strongly
unfoldable, then it remains so in L, and we may work again in L and chop
off the universe at the first inaccessible cardinal above κ, if necessary, which
results in a strongly unfoldable cardinal in L that is not uplifting there, as
desired.
Results analogous to theorem 23 hold for axiom-A forcing, for α-proper
forcing with α < ω1, and for semi-proper forcing by essentially the same
proofs. If the existence of a strongly unfoldable uplifting cardinal is con-
sistent, then it follows from theorem 23 that RA(proper) is independent
from the conjunction of the three forcing axioms PFAc, PFA(ℵ2-preserving)
and PFA(ℵ3-preserving). The same holds for the weak resurrection ax-
ioms, such as wRA(proper) and wRA(countably closed), and also for the
axioms RA(semi-proper) and RA(axiom-A) and their weak counterparts
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wRA(semi-proper) and wRA(axiom-A). Meanwhile, it seems unclear to us
how to show, say, that RA(proper) can fail if PFA holds.
We conclude this paper by foreshadowing our follow-up article [HJ], a
natural continuation of this article, in which we introduce and consider the
boldface analogues of the resurrection axioms, allowing a predicate A ⊆ c
and asking for A∗ ⊆ cV [g∗h] in V [g ∗ h] with 〈Hc,∈, A〉 ≺ 〈H
V [g∗h]
c ,∈, A
∗〉.
In that article, we prove the equiconsistency of the boldface resurrection
axioms with the existence of a strongly uplifting cardinal, a weak form of
1-extendibility, which we prove is the same as a superstrongly unfoldable
cardinal, generalizing the weakly superstrong cardinals.
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